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Relaxing constraints as a conservation policy
Running Title: Relaxing constraints as a conservation policy
May 31, 2013
Abstract
Eco-entrepreneurs in developing countries are often subject to market or institutional con-
straints such as missing markets. Conservation interventions which relax constraints may be
both cost-e¤ective and poverty reducing. A simulation using data from an intervention in
Madagascar to relax the technological constraints of forest honey production investigates this
possibility. Cost-e¤ectively achieving dual environment-development goals is shown to depend
on the severity of constraints, relative prices, along with the nature and e¢ ciency in use of tech-
nology. Success is more likely for technologies exhibiting close to constant returns to scale or
high input complementarity. Forest honey does not meet these requirements. Ultimately, where
market or institutional constraints are present, knowledge of the recipient technology is required
for more informed, e¢ cient and perhaps, more politically-acceptable conservation policy.
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1 Introduction
Policies that emphasise the use of incentives to conserve ecosystems such as forests have emerged as
potentially cost-e¤ective alternatives to command-and-control instruments (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002;
Bulte and Engel, 2006). In particular, payments are o¤ered directly, sometimes in the form of cash
subsidies, to policy recipients in exchange for conserving forest, e.g. Payments for Environmental
Services (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales) in Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008). Incentives can also be
provided indirectly by donors via some associated input to joint production of private and public
goods, e.g. subsidies for capital inputs to eco-tourism or forest honey production (Wunder, 2000;
Bradbear, 2009). In developing countries, such interventions often aim to improve the incomes and
livelihoods of the poor while conserving ecosystems.
A trade-o¤ between inducing cost-e¤ective forest conservation and raising the prots of an eco-
entrepreneurwas demonstrated by Ferraro and Simpson (2002). They show that when markets
are perfect and side payments are not possible, a budget-constrained donor always prefers PES to
the more indirect approach due to the formers cost-e¤ectiveness. The eco-entrepreneur, say a local
eco-tourist operator or honey producer, on the other hand, prefers the indirect approach since she
prots from the additional transfers required. Cost-e¤ectiveness is thus analysed in terms of the
relative deadweight losses associated with each type of policy. Groom and Palmer (2010), on the
other hand, show that where eco-entrepreneurs face market and institutional constraints, e.g. input
constraints or credit rationing, policies which relax these may be both cost-e¤ective for donors and
prot enhancing for the eco-entrepreneur.1 This is due to released rents over and above the donors
payments, known as constraint rents. Therefore, relaxing a constraint is more cost-e¤ective than
PES if these rents outweigh the relative deadweight losses.
The theoretical results derived by Groom and Palmer (2010) are not closed-form solutions and
raise questions about the precise conditions under which PES or relaxing constraints are cost-
e¤ective. They are also silent on how one might identify and evaluate market constraints. In
this paper, we provide explicit solutions and show how the theory could be operationalised in a
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real-world policy setting: forest honey production in Madagascar. Honey production has for some
time been promoted by NGOs and donors both as a means of improving livelihoods and conserving
forests in some developing countries (see Bradbear, 2009). Since Ferraro and Simpson (2002)
utilised this setting, we compare their results to our own. The constraint identied in Madagascar
is technological and typical of those faced by producers in many developing countries. We rst
extend the theory developed by Groom and Palmer (2010) in order to characterise this constraint.
The relative cost-e¤ectiveness of relaxing constraints versus PES is then evaluated by calibrating the
model using survey data. In a further departure from the earlier paper, this allows for an exploration
of three new dimensions for the analysis of policy cost-e¤ectiveness. First, how di¤erent types of
production process might inuence policy cost-e¤ectiveness and second, how cost-e¤ectiveness varies
under di¤erent market conditions. Finally, we relax the assumption that production is e¢ cient with
respect to the use of inputs. Specically, we examine how cost-e¤ectiveness varies when producers
are technically ine¢ cient.
Insights from our analysis could potentially guide policymakers who have limited information
regarding market and institutional conditions. In particular, the technological constraint observed
in Madagascar applies to capital inputs used in production, which are subsidised and purchased by
local NGOs. Relaxing this constraint enables producers to switch from traditional to semi-modern
beehives. We test the sensitivity of the results to relative price and technological parameters.
Further simulations reveal that, while relaxing constraints to forest honey production is unlikely to
be cost-e¤ective compared to PES from the perspective of the donor, it might be more cost-e¤ective
overall in the sense of minimising the deadweight losses of the intervention. Cost-e¤ectiveness is
also shown to be highly dependent on the nature of the technology, particularly returns to scale and
input complementarity. Our innovative method of characterising the constraint could potentially
be applied to other eco-production activities such as sustainable forest management (SFM) and
shade co¤ee production. Once a constraint has been identied, it could be used to evaluate policy
cost-e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency and hence, contribute to deliberations on policy choice prior to
implementation.
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The results are important because, contrary to the perfect market and institutional setting
of Ferraro and Simpson (2002), constraints, institutional failures and market failures are the rule
rather than the exception in many developing countries (Ellis, 1998; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005).
Therefore, providing credit, expertise and technology, or more secure land rights in such settings
might be more cost-e¤ective interventions for increasing forest cover compared with the use of
nancial incentives such as PES. Our results also indicate that the analysis of cost-e¤ectiveness for
the donor is not su¢ cient to evaluate the desirability of the programme. In a constrained world,
e¢ ciency and distributional issues are also important determinants of success (FAO, 2010).
The paper proceeds as follows. From Ferraro and Simpson (2002) and Groom and Palmer
(2010), we rst restate the conditions necessary for e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness to the donor and
the impact on the eco-entrepreneurs prots, in Section 2. The conditions for cost-e¤ectiveness
when producers are technically ine¢ cient is presented in Section 3. The model is then calibrated
for forest honey producers using data collected from Madagascar, in Section 4. We develop a
method of dening the technological constraint and assessing the policy that was implemented to
relax this. In Section 5, we present our results, including a comparison with those of Ferraro and
Simpson (2002). Following from a sensitivity analysis in Section 6, Section 7 discusses the results
before concluding.
2 Conditions for e¢ ciency and the preferences of the donor and
eco-entrepreneur
We begin by summarising the theoretical conditions for e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness to the donor
and the impact on the eco-entrepreneurs prots (or income) of conserving forest either indirectly
via the expansion of a joint production activity or directly via payments for forest land. These
conditions form the basis for the empirical simulation. Groom and Palmer (2010) extended Fer-
raro and Simpson (2002) to develop these conditions for a prot-maximising yet input-constrained
producer with concave production function Q = F (K;F ) using capital (K) and forest (F ) as in-
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puts. Prices for output, Q; and inputs are given by PQ, PK and PF , respectively. Market and
institutional imperfections are introduced via the presence of a binding constraint on capital, K.
The conditions follow from the comparative statics of the constrained prot function, in contrast
to the unconstrained case analysed by Ferraro and Simpson (2002). In particular, when input
(output) markets are constrained and rationing by quantity occurs, the relevant decision price for
the entrepreneur is no longer the market price PK but the higher (lower) virtualprice, Pv: Hence,
a constraint rent exists, Pv   PK , which measures the value of relaxing the constraint. We rst
state the conditions found by Groom and Palmer (2010) under technical e¢ ciency. The appendix
provides technical details under the assumption and the following results can be established under
the assumption that the e¢ ciency parameter is equal to unity:  = 1.
2.1 Overall cost-e¤ectiveness
Overall cost-e¤ectiveness is evaluated by comparing the deadweight losses and gains associated with
relaxing constraints with those of paying for the conservation of forest land through a PES scheme.
The latter payment is given by dPF . For an eco-entrepreneur facing a capital constraint K; where
the unit resource cost of relaxing the constraint is the underlying market price PK , forest-land
payments are more cost-e¤ective if:
dC =
dK
2
 dP Iv   dPDv    P 0v   PK dK
relative deadweight losses constraint rent
> 0 (1)
where dC is the incremental cost of relaxing constraints compared to forest-land payments, dK is
the amount of capital required to increase forest land, and P 0v is the initial virtual price of capital.
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The term dP Iv is the change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of relaxing the constraint
on capital while dPDv is the change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of the forest-land
payment. Given the assumptions, the former is negative and the latter is positive. The second
term is the constraint rent associated with relaxing the constraint, and is positive. Hence, the sign
of dC, and the relative e¢ ciency of the two policies is indeterminate.
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2.2 The donors preferred policy
The donor must either pay  FdPF , directly for forest land, or PKdK under the policy of relaxing
constraints. A donor concerned solely with cost-e¤ectiveness prefers payments if it costs less:
 FdPF < PKdK (2)
As shown by Groom and Palmer (2010), this condition becomes:
UKF
CFF
< UKK +
1
K
@K
@Pv
 
P 0v   PK

(3)
where Cij is the constrained elasticity of demand for input i with respect to the price of input j,
and Uij is the unconstrained equivalent. This reveals the dependence on features of the technology:
the virtual price elasticity of demand for capital, UKK ; the constraint rent associated with the
constraint,
 
P 0v   PK

; the unconstrained cross-price elasticity of inputs, UKF ; and, the constrained
own-price elasticity of demand for forest land, CFF . Condition (3) states that the donor prefers
forest payments rather relaxing constraints when: the constraint rent is low; the demand for forest
is inelastic with respect to price; and, capital and forests are highly complementary (high UKF ):
Note, however, that the virtual price Pv depends on the elasticities.
2.3 The eco-entrepreneurs preferred policy
When the eco-entrepreneur is constrained in an input market, for small changes in PF or K, her
prots will change, respectively, as follows:
dCF =
@C
@PF
dPF =  FdPF
dCK =
@C
@K
dK = P 0v dK
Hence, if the donor pays the resource cost of relaxing the constraint, the eco-entrepreneur prefers
a payment for forest land if:
 FdPF > P 0v dK (4)
This condition becomes:
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UKF
CFF
> UKK (5)
The analysis shows that when the demand for forest land and capital are highly complementarity,
in the sense of there being a large, positive, unconstrained cross-price elasticity, UKF ; and where
the constrained own-price elasticity of forest, CFF , is inelastic, then the eco-entrepreneur will prefer
to participate in PES since it requires a larger payment. It is in direct tension with condition (3)
for the donor.
However, despite this tension, when the constraint rent is positive, P 0v > PK , conditions (2)
and (4) can hold simultaneously in favour of relaxing constraints so that both the donor and
eco-entrepreneur will prefer this. The area of agreement is large whenever the constraint rent is
large, i.e. due to a high, positive value of P 0v . Relaxing constraints can, in principle, provide
cost-e¤ective conservation of forest land for the donor while also providing a large transfer to the
eco-entrepreneur through the released constraint rent. Once again, since the virtual price, Pv;
depends on the elasticities in condition (3) and (5), more investigation is required to illustrate
which intervention is preferred and under what circumstances.
In summary, given the technological assumptions three outcomes are possible depending on the
cost of the intervention: i) donors prefer forest-land payments through a PES scheme and producers
prefer relaxation of constraints; ii) both parties prefer relaxation of constraints; iii) donors prefer
relaxing constraints and eco-entrepreneurs prefer PES. While Ferraro and Simpsons (2002) results
held for all homothetic technologies, this result does not depend primarily on homotheticity and
may hold for a wider variety of technologies.
3 Cost-e¤ectiveness with technical ine¢ ciency
Thus far, we have assumed that production is always e¢ cient with respect to the use of inputs.
When producers in developing countries are technically and/or allocatively ine¢ cient, there are
likely to be implications for the relative cost-e¤ectiveness and welfare impacts of PES and policies
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to relax constraints. To illustrate, we focus on the case of a technically ine¢ cient producer. This
choice is motivated by our examination of the technological constraint in honey production (see
next section). Arnade and Trueblood (2002) dene the input distance function: DI (Q;F;K) =  1
where   1; and production is technically ine¢ cient when  < 1. Given duality between the
distance function and the cost function (C (Q;PK ; PF )), the prot maximisation problem for a
homogeneous technology then becomes:3
 (PQ; PK ; PF ) = max
y
PQy    1C (Q;PK ; PF )
Via Shepherds Lemma the demand for input i becomes: @ (PQ; PK ; PF ) =@Pi =   1xi (PQ; PK ; PF ),
and the input demand becomes:
 i = xi (PQ; PK ; PF ) (6)
The appendix shows that with technical ine¢ ciency the condition for relative e¢ ciency becomes:
dC =
1
2

@FC
@PF
(dPF )
2   @Pv
@K
(dK)2

   P 0v   PK dK (7)
+

   1


@FC
@PF
dPF + F0

dPF  
 
P 0v   PK

dK

The rst two terms are essentially identical to those under technical e¢ ciency ( = 1). The third
term arises as a consequence of technical ine¢ ciency. This changes the relative e¢ ciency of the two
policies. Interestingly, the preferences of the donor and the producer are una¤ected. The donor
is still only interested in relative costs and will prefer PES over relaxing constraints if  FdPF <
PKdK. The recipient prefers PES if:
dCF > d
C
K ()   1FdPF >  1P 0v dK
which reduces to the same condition as under technical e¢ ciency. Therefore, the presence of
technical ine¢ ciency does not a¤ect agentspreferences over policies, but does a¤ect the relative
overall cost-e¤ectiveness.
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4 Policy choice to conserve forest in Central Menabe, Madagascar
4.1 Background
The eco-entrepreneur in our case study is the forest honey producer of Central Menabe, located on
the west coast of Madagascar. They are observed to receive a new and more productive technology
for honey production as the result of a donor intervention. This strategy is observed to relax a
technological constraint on production. Market and institutional constraints have long been ob-
served in Madagascar, particularly in agricultural and credit markets. These contribute to poverty
among rural households (see, for example, Barratt and Dorosh, 1996; Minten and Barratt, 2008).4
Honey producing households reside in poor, resource-dependent communities located at the
edge of a bio-diverse rich, dry forest. Preserving biodiversity in the area, including a number of
endemic and currently endangered animal species, is one of the greatest ecological challenges that
Madagascar faces (Nicoll, 2003). Deforestation via slash-and-burn agriculture occurs at an annual
rate of 1 percent (Scales, 2007).
Numerous NGOs, both local and international, and donors alike operate in the region primarily
(but not necessarily exclusively) to conserve biodiversity. For example, the Durrell Wildlife Trust
has been experimenting with an environmental auction among local communities to participate in
biodiversity monitoring. Conservation payments were paid out to the winnersof the auction. In
our study area, NGOs have been considering various interventions including PES and eco-tourism
as a means of raising incomes and conserving forest (Dirac, 2009). They have also been providing
support to households for the expansion of beekeeping and honey production.
Beekeeping and honey production is well-established in Central Menabe, although usually only
as an income complement to agriculture.5 Bees forage in diverse natural and secondary forest for-
mations in the vicinity of beehives. Households engaged in honey production are observed to use
two types of beehive, typically located in and around villages: traditional and semi-modern. In
traditional beekeeping, beehives are typically single, large empty logs found in the forest, closed on
each side with only very small apertures for the bees. For semi-modern beekeeping, farmers use
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semi-modern beehives, generally Langstroth or Kenyan models. Semi-modern hives are more spa-
cious than the traditional ones with honey produced on cadresinside, which need to be periodically
removed and the honey gathered (Dirac, personal communication).
To calibrate the model we use primary data on agricultural activities and non-timber forest
products, including beekeeping, collected between 2005 and 2007 (Dirac, 2009).6 On average, a
honey-producing household owns 1.84 beehives, of which 1.2 and 0.64 are classied as traditional
and semi-modern, respectively. Including labour costs to build and maintain over the course of a
year, traditional beehives cost US$ 8.10 per unit while semi-modern hives cost US$ 23.82. Note,
however, that semi-modern hives are not constructed locally. Instead, they are donated by local
NGOs. Hence, the price of semi-modern hives is the market price paid by the NGO in addition
to the costs of training local households to use the hives e¤ectively. No market for semi-modern
hives exists in the study-area villages. A traditional beehive produces an average of 15 litres of
honey per year while the more productive semi-modern type produces 32 litres annually. Honey
is typically sold in the villages, either to locals or middlemen who then sell honey in more distant
markets. During the study period, honey prices remained stable at around US$ 2.87 per litre.
Honey production requires forest land as an input. Indeed, honey yield has been found to
increase with proximity to forest (see Sande et al., 2009). It also requires labour and capital inputs
more or less in xed proportions. In principle, therefore, a donor wishing to conserve forests could
purchase forest land or capital inputs. Both would simultaneously enhance honey production while
employing more forest land in production.
4.2 Calibration of constrained honey production
4.2.1 The technology
Ferraro and Simpson (2002) characterise the semi-modern technology of honey production in Mada-
gascar. Given our limited data, we return to their characterisation of the following Cobb-Douglas
production function: Q = AKF , where Q is honey production, A is a productivity parameter, 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and  are the elasticities of capital and forest, respectively, K and F . Due to gaps in our own data,
we utilise the following parameter values estimated by Ferraro and Simpson (ibid). The technology
has strong diminishing returns to scale in that  = 0:36 and  = 0:15, with A = 48. In addition,
 and  reect a low output elasticity of capital, K, and particularly forest, F . This deterministi-
cally captures the low complementarity between F and K and the loose relationship between honey
production and forests that might arise from non-rivalry. The exposition here assumed technical
e¢ ciency:  = 1:
4.2.2 The constraint and behavioural assumptions
Our data contain no explicit denition of the individual constraints faced by honey producers.
Nevertheless, the presence of two types of beehive in the sample, semi-modern and traditional,
allows us to identify and characterise the production constraint when combined with assumptions
concerning the production technology. In particular, semi-modern beehives are twice as productive
as traditional ones, and are only used by recipients of assistance from NGOs working in the area.
This provides a prima facie case for the existence of a technological constraint underpinned by
a capital constraint, which is being relaxed by external donor intervention. We characterise the
constraint as follows.
We rst dene the traditional technology as being a nested version of the semi-modern technol-
ogy, di¤ering only in the e¤ective capital embodied in each beehive. Thus, we dene the technology
in terms of e¤ective capital EK: Q = A (EK) F , where E = 1 for the traditional technology,
and E > 1 for the semi-modern technology. K represents the number of beehives and E represents
the di¤erences in the construction of traditional and semi-modern. EK can be understood as the
interior surface area for honey production.7 Characterising the technology in this way allows us to
represent the traditional technology as a capital-constrained version of the semi-modern technology.
In what follows, we calibrate the values of E and K.
We assume that both traditional and semi-modern producers are prot maximisers conditional
on their own technology and the associated prices. This denes supply functions: QT (P TK ; PF ;E
T =
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1) and QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM

, for each technology. These di¤er only because of the values of the
parameter E and the price of traditional and semi-modern beehives, P TK and P
SM
K , respectively.
To dene the parameter E for semi-modern producers we use the observation that the prot-
maximising output of traditional production is approximately half that of unconstrained semi-
modern production: QSM = 2QT . This leads to the following denition of ESM :
QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM

= 2QT
 
P TK ; PF ;E
T = 1

(8)
With ESM dened, it is then possible to dene the e¤ective capital constraint, K, faced by tradi-
tional producers in terms of the semi-modern technology:
QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM

= 2QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM ; K

(9)
The implication of (8) and (9) is that QSM
 
PSMK ; PF ;E
SM ; K

= QT
 
P TK ; PF ;E
T = 1

. That
is, unconstrained traditional producers are modelled as constrained semi-modern producers.
The assumptions underlying our method of characterising the capital constraint have the follow-
ing implications. Both the traditional and the constrained semi-modern producers have constrained
supply curves (Q) and constrained demand curves for forest, FC (:) ; that are identical in PF  space.
However, the demand for e¤ective capital di¤ers between these two technologies, with the latent
demand for e¤ective capital much higher for semi-modern capital due to its higher productivity.
Relaxing the capital constraint assumes that the honey producer is assisted in shifting from one
technology to another as additional semi-modern hives are provided as part of the policy approach.
Thus, the impact of this approach is analysed along the semi-modern demand curve rather than
the traditional.
There are two possible constrained scenarios when considering forest-land payments. First, a
partially-constrained analysis in which payments induce additional traditional hives to be employed,
KT . Second, a totally-constrained scenario in which capital remains constrained at K. We
compare both scenarios to relaxing the constraint, K, with semi-modern capital.
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4.3 Dening the constraint: The constrained and unconstrained solutions
We use the following parameter values from the data for the simulation: [; ; A; PSMK ; P
T
K ; PQ;
QSM=QT ] = [0:36; 0:15; 48; 24; 8; 3; 2]. Table 1 shows the solutions to the traditional technology,
the semi-modern and the constrained semi-modern technologies.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Solving for ESM using (8) leads to ESM = 7:7. The semi-modern technology, with its greater
e¤ective capital, produces greater quantities and prots while using more forest with fewer beehives.
Using (9) to solve for the capital constraint yields: K = 2:4. This reects the e¤ectivecapital
constraint faced by producers using traditional technology in terms of the semi-modern technology,
as seen in the semi-modern constrained scenario in row three of Table 1.8
The simulation has two parts. First, we estimate the forest payment, dPF , and the amount of
capital, dK, required to increase forest. We follow Ferraro and Simpson (2002) in analysing the cost
of the intervention required to e¤ect a 0.1 ha change in forest for a single producer, assuming that
ten producers are subject to the intervention. We estimate forest-land payments for the two possible
constrained scenarios described above, partial and total. Second, we undertake a comparison of
these results to the case where market conditions are ignored. That is, where it is assumed that
the producer is unconstrained and responds to payments, either to forest land or capital, dPF and
dPK . In all cases we treat both capital and forest-land inputs as a ow despite the potential for
capital to be a one-o¤ intervention.
5 Results: forest payments vs relaxation of the constraint
5.1 What is cost-e¤ective overall?
The intervention that is cost-e¤ective overall is determined by condition (1). If the incremental cost,
dC, is negative then the honey producer prefers constraints to be relaxed.9 Given the technological
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assumptions this condition holds and the cost-e¤ective intervention, i.e. that which minimises the
deadweight losses, is for constraints to be relaxed.10
Table 2 details the impact of the interventions. In the totally-constrained case, the deadweight
loss when constraints are relaxed is US$ 3:2 compared to one of US$ 0:35 when a forest-land payment
is made. However, there is a large e¢ ciency gain as a consequence of relaxing the constraint, which
is measured by the released constraint rent of US$ 26:4. The incremental cost of employing a
payment rather than relaxing the capital constraint in this case is therefore US$ 23:6:
[TABLE 2 HERE]
In e¤ect, the donors contributions release extra resources which contribute both to the envi-
ronmental objective and the welfare of the producer and hence, could improve the latter. But if the
donor is concerned only with the much narrower objective of cost-e¤ectiveness, then it will prefer
forest payments to supplying capital inputs, as shown below.
5.2 What the donor prefers
The donors preferences are determined by equation (3). With the decreasing returns to scale
(DRS) technology of honey production this condition becomes: P 0v   PK < 0. That is, the donor
prefers to make a forest-land payment if the augmentedconstraint rent, P 0v   PK is less than
zero, which is the case with the parameter values used here.11 Table 2 shows the implications for
the producers prots and donors costs in both the partially- and totally-constrained cases. In the
latter, US$ 6:17 is required to induce an increase of 0.1 ha. Since the donor must pay for all units
of forest employed, on average 0:98 ha, not just the marginal units, the total cost per producer is:
 FdPF = 6:05. The total cost over 10 producers is US$ 60:5.12 In the former, producers are more
responsive and the cost to the donor is reduced to US$ 54:3. Reecting equation (3), this shows
that forest-land payments become less cost-e¤ective the more constrained the honey producer.
Table 2 also shows the outcome of an intervention to relax constraints.13 Although 0:7 additional
units of capital (approximately 1.5 beehives) are required to induce the required increase in forest
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land, the donors cost across ten households is US$ 168 where PSMK = 24. On the basis of cost-
e¤ectiveness for the donor, it is clear that the donor would prefer the payment for forest land.
This would save around US$ 108 per ha of forest conserved, with a greater saving if producers can
introduce more traditional beehives in response.
5.3 What the honey producer prefers
The honey producers preferences are determined by the inequality shown in (4). With the DRS
technology he will prefer the intervention to relax constraints if  < 1, which is clearly the case
since  = 0:15. Table 2 shows the implications for the producers prots and the donors costs
in both the partially- and totally-constrained scenarios. The increase in prots from the forest-
land payment is only US$ 5.1 or US$ 5.7 in these respective scenarios. While these payments are
increasingly desirable to the producer when it is more constrained, the impact on prot should be
compared to a change of over US$ 40 when constraints are relaxed. A signicant portion of the
latter is the released constraint rent
  
P 0v   PSMK

dK

, which is indicated by dCR in Table 2 and
estimated to be approximately US$ 26:4.14
In summary, when considering market conditions for the case of Malagasy honey producers, the
preferences of the donor and the producer remain in tension regardless of whether the producer
can adjust traditional capital or not. This nding accords with Ferraro and Simpson (2002) who
ignored market conditions. Hence, even where honey producers are technologically constrained,
conservation and income objectives remain in tension from the perspective of the donor: the cost-
e¤ective strategy does not induce the greatest transfer to the producer.
5.4 What if we ignore market conditions?
The lower part of Table 2 shows the results when honey producers are assumed to be unconstrained
prot maximisers. We analyse the response of an unconstrained semi-modern producer to forest
payments or subsidies to capital, rather than relaxing capital constraints. As well as placing donor
and producer in tension, ignoring market conditions makes these transfers look more cost-e¤ective
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than they actually are. This can be seen in the underestimation of the costs to the donor of US$
53.9 rather than US$ 60.5 per ha of conserved forest for a totally-constrained producer. On the
other hand, the benets to producers are underestimated: US$ 5.2 instead of US$ 5.7.
6 Sensitivity analysis
In the case of Madagascar the donor prefers payments for forest land even when market conditions
are considered. The producer, on the other hand, prefers capital constraints to be relaxed. Overall,
the cost-e¤ective course of action is to relax constraints in honey production. As the following
sensitivity analysis illustrates, these results are sensitive to the nature of the joint production
technology, technical ine¢ ciency as well as the relative prices of inputs and outputs.
We focus on parameters that describe the Cobb-Douglas technology: ,  and the returns to
scale k =  + , and the level of technical ine¢ ciency reected by the parameter : We restrict
attention to the more plausible decreasing returns to scale case (DRS). In the DRS case the condi-
tions under which the donor and eco-entrepreneur both prefer to relax constraints (conditions (2)
and (4), respectively) can be combined to yield P 0v > P
0
v > PK (Groom and Palmer, 2009): The
rst inequality shows that in most circumstances the eco-entrepreneur will prefer constraints to be
relaxed, since it requires  < 1. This leaves two of the possible outcomes outlined in Section 2.3:
either the donor prefers the forest payment and the eco-entrepreneur prefers relaxing constraints,
or both agree on relaxing constraints. Whether or not tension exists between the agents on the
appropriate intervention depends on the donors preferences. In the Cobb-Douglas case the donor
prefers to relax constraints if the augmented constraint rent is positive:
P 0v   PK > 0 (10)
The augmented constraint rent is closely related to the constraint rent P 0v PK ; which conditions
(2) and (4) showed to be pivotal in general. Taking K as given, the sensitivity of the donors
preferred choice of intervention to technological parameters  and  can be evaluated by plotting
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those values that equate the augmented constraint rent to zero: P 0v   PK = 0.15 This yields
the upper curved line in Figure 1, which is given by Equation (2). To compare this to other DRS
technologies, combinations of  and  such that  +  = k are also plotted: Values of  and 
above the upper curved line such that +  < 1 yield a positive, augmented constraint rent.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 1 reveals that the characteristics of the technology determine whether the augmented
constraint rent is positive for any given constraint. Agents might agree to relax constraints when
there is large  and , which has two interesting interpretations in the Cobb-Douglas case. First,
the constrained elasticity of forest with respect to the capital constraint, C
F K
= = (1  ), is
increasing in  and : This indicates that where forest and capital are highly complementary in
production, the donor will prefer to relax constraints because only small increments of capital are
required to achieve an increase in forest conservation. Second, large  and  indicates higher
returns to scale. Figure 1 shows that the closer technology is to constant returns to scale (CRS)
the more likely it is that the donor will prefer relaxing constraints to forest-land payments. In sum,
increased complementarity and higher returns to scale increase the augmented constraint rent and
make relaxing constraints more favourable.16
Fixing returns to scale such that  +  = k reveals that intermediate, rather than extreme,
values of  and  are more likely to lead to the relaxation of constraints being preferred by donors.
In the Cobb-Douglas case a general interpretation of this observation is that donors are less likely
to prefer to relax constraints where technologies are either highly capital or forest intensive. This
reects the tradeo¤ between complementarity, forest-price elasticity and other determinants of
the augmented constraint rent. For instance, holding returns to scale xed, an increase in 
towards extreme values simultaneously decreases complementarity and increases the price elasticity
of demand for forest
 
CFF = 1= (   1)

thus making forest-land payments preferable to the eco-
entrepreneur. Furthermore, although high values of  increase complementarity, when returns to
17
scale are held constant the augmented constraint rent eventually declines as  diminishes. Figure
3 in the appendix shows that the precise relationship depends on relative prices.
The parameter values for forest honey production are indicated in Figure 1. Here, returns to
scale are strongly decreasing since k = + = 0:51. Complementarity between forest and capital is
low since  and  are small: = (   1) =  0:42: The constrained price elasticity of forest demand,
on the other hand, is relatively large, at  1:56. Ultimately, the donor prefers forest-land payments,
and there are no values of  and  such that the donor would prefer to relax constraints at the
existing returns to scale.
Similar results hold when one abstracts from the individual agents and considers overall e¢ -
ciency (Equation 1). In Figure 1 the lower curved line plots values of  and  for which forest-land
payments and relaxing constraints are equally cost-e¤ective overall. Above the line relaxing con-
straints is cost e¤ective and the range of values for which this is the case is larger and includes
honey production. This reects the fact that the full welfare e¤ect includes the released constraint
rent over and above any payments. Hence, if a Coasian bargain over the constraint rent could be
struck between donor and eco-entrepreneur then the donor might be persuaded to opt for relaxing
constraints.
Lastly, Figure 2 shows the impact of technical ine¢ ciency. In case of forest honey production,
lower levels of technical e¢ ciency make PES more e¢ cient relative to relaxing constraints. This
arises because the cost savings for ine¢ cient rms leveraged by PES subsidies outweigh the con-
straint rents released as a consequence of relaxing the technological constraint. With a decline
in technical e¢ ciency, the donors preferred policy then becomes the policy that is cost-e¤ective
overall.
7 Discussion and conclusions
In addressing the cost-e¤ectiveness of conservation payments, Ferraro and Simpson (2002) ab-
stracted from the important fact that there are likely to be multiple market failures in develop-
18
ing world conservation-related enterprises. Their nding that direct approaches to conservation
are much more cost-e¤ective than indirect approaches is therefore suspect. In this paper we in-
vestigate empirically the market, institutional and technological conditions under which di¤erent
policy interventions to induce forest conservation are cost-e¤ective and agreed upon by donor and
eco-entrepreneur alike. Identifying these conditions may assist in choice of policy instrument in
constrained market and institutional settings, and indicate when dual environmental and income-
enhancing goals are likely to be achieved via conservation payments.
The main nding in relation to honey production in Madagascar is that relaxing constraints is
unlikely to be cost-e¤ective for the donor, despite a clear technological constraint. Stark decreasing
returns to scale and weak relationships between capital and forest inputs tend to favour payments
to conserve forest land despite the severity of the constraint. This result is strengthened when one
considers technical ine¢ ciency. These quantitative results are also strengthened when on considers
what is left out of the production analysis. For example, the link between capital and forest
might be weaker still considering the public good nature of forests, to the extent that this is not
reected in the DRS technology. The honey producer, however, prefers technological constraints
to be relaxed due to the transfer of constraint rents. Without side payments the two actors prefer
di¤erent interventions and hence environmental and income-generation objectives are in tension.
Such tensions can be detrimental to the success of conservation schemes (FAO, 2009).
Nonetheless, even in the case of forest honey production relaxing constraints generates an overall
welfare gain since the released constraint rent is larger than any deadweight loss. Hence, relaxing
constraints could be preferred by both parties (Pareto improving) if side payments/matching funds
(lower PK) or some other form of Coasian bargain were possible. Alternatively, if the donor factors
in e¢ ciency gains, i.e. both environmental and development goals, into its objective then again,
the two objectives could be achieved simultaneously. This might be the case, for example, for
donors looking to include poverty alleviation as a co-benetof policy to Reduce Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD).
Eco-production is unlikely to be e¢ cient with respect to the use of inputs. Technical ine¢ ciency
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is shown to change the relative cost-e¤ectiveness of both policy approaches. Subsidies to inputs
will reduce costs (increase prots) to the producer over an above the the donors outlay. For a
technically ine¢ cient producer, relative cost-e¤ectiveness then depends on the initial expenditure
on each input. The goal of cost-e¤ectiveness will favour targeting the input with the highest initial
expenditure, since this will o¤er the greatest potential cost reduction. This mechanism is very
similar to the release of the constraint rent and raises issues of payment targeting on the basis
of technical e¢ ciency. Qualitatively similar results can be obtained when the rm is allocatively
ine¢ cient. A more detailed analysis of technical ine¢ ciency along with other types of production
ine¢ ciencies is left for future work.
Our analysis of relaxing market/institutional constraints can be applied to other joint produc-
tion activities. Of particular relevance is the characterisation of relaxing constraints as the provision
of input-augmenting technological change. For instance, one of the main constraints to sustainable
forest management (SFM) and agro-forestry activities such as shade co¤ee production is techni-
cal capacity (FAO, 2009). Capacity building by donors and governments can be represented in
our framework by a labour-augmenting technological change. Such interventions are frequently
implemented by NGOs and international donors. Another technological constraint to the specic
example of SFM concerns capital in the form of monitoring and verication technologies, which
have also been the subject of donor intervention, e.g. in Ecuador.
Yet, we acknowledge that informational requirements are likely to vary from one activity to
the next. Indeed, misidentifying constraints could lead to policy failure. Where constraints are
readily identiable using basic survey data, as in the case of honey production, then our method
of characterising these could be applied. But where they are more di¢ cult to identify the data
requirements will be more demanding. Di¤erent methods may also be needed in order to analyse
these data. To illustrate how constraints could be identied in more challenging settings, Blackman
et al. (2008) analysed land-use (satellite) and socio-economic (survey) data in order to examine how
shade co¤ee impacts on land clearing in Oaxaca, Mexico. They nd that the existence of worker
cooperatives is negatively correlated with clearing. Such cooperatives tend to subsidise postharvest
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processing, quality control, and agricultural extension. On the basis of these results, they conclude
that policies intended to benet farmers such as promoting marketing initiatives and subsidising
inputs may help preserve tree cover when the output is a non-timber agroforestry crop.
Although not technological, credit rationing is also a common constraint. For example, credit
constraints were found to be a major cause of the abandonment of shade co¤ee plantations in Mexico
(see Blackman et al., 2005). Credit rationing is also a constraint to SFM, which has high initial costs
of tree-planting. Financial instruments such as forestry funds and environmental bond guarantees
could help relax these constraints (FAO, 2009). Our analysis shows that such interventions could
be cost-e¤ective. Yet, since credit is highly fungible, it would need to be targeted in such a way
to prevent ecosystem conversion or provided conditional on being used for certain, pre-specied
activities (see below).
More generally, Groom and Palmer (2009) show that there is a symmetric problem in which
relaxing constraints can reduce input use in activities which degrade or convert forest, such as
agriculture. A typical example is o¤-farm labour constraints, which can reduce on-farm labour and
land use if these inputs are complementary. Not only are such constraints commonplace, but input
complementarity in this context is arguably more plausible than in the case of an ecoentrepreneur.
Marchand (2010) and Groom et al. (2010) found such agricultural technologies in the Brazilian
Amazon and China, respectively. Constant returns to scale are also more likely in such cases (e.g.
Cornia, 1985; Marchand, 2010).
The idea of relaxing constraints to o¤-farm activities in order to induce cost-e¤ective forest
conservation has also been examined in numerous studies. O¤-farm labour constraints, such as
those documented in Nepal, the Phillipines, and China (e.g. Blu¤stone 1995; Shively and Pagiola,
2004; Grosjean and Kontoleon, 2009) arise due to involuntary unemployment, weak land tenure and
missing property rights, and institutional constraints to mobility, e.g. the Hukou system in China.17
Relaxing such constraints may achieve dual environmental and income-generating objectives. For
example, in the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP), the relaxation of liquidity and o¤-
farm labour market constraints succeeded in both reducing poverty and providing environmental
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benets (Gauvin et al., 2009; Uchida et al., 2009; Groom et al. 2010). Shively and Pagiola (2004)
nd similar results in the Phillipines. Such cases illustrate the additional benet of harmonising
the preferences of stakeholders, an oft-cited requirement for the success of conservation schemes
(FAO, 2009).
There are some obvious limitations to the analysis, however. One caveat is that the results
are underpinned by prot maximisation. If agricultural producers are satiscing, relaxing input
constraints would be much less e¤ective in conserving forest and improving welfare. Forest-land
payments via a PES scheme would also be ine¤ective in this case.18 Relaxing constraints in agri-
cultural technology, on the other hand, could reduce agricultural land use. Similarly, where cash
payments are used, ine¤ectiveness may be further reinforced by local resistance to the use of such
payments, as has been observed in Madagascar (see, for example, Pollini 2008; Hockley and An-
driamarovololona 2007). Our model also assumes that producers engage in a single activity. Where
recipients engage in several activities, it may be possible for the physical or human capital supplied
in an intervention to be deployed in a non-conservation activity. As noted, credit is particularly
fungible. This issue of fungibility speaks to the broader issue of monitoring and enforcement, which
a¤ects both types of intervention considered. Lastly, while we have been able to characterise and
quantify the constraint in the case of honey production, relaxing some of the other constraints
discussed is often more di¢ cult. Governmentsattempts to relaxing credit constraints or improve
market access, for instance, have not always led to welfare improvements.
There are also dynamic issues to consider. One question is whether one of these types of policy
intervention could be more easily adapted over time as circumstances change. However, the relative
exibility of PES vis-a-vis relaxing constraints is not clearcut. For example, it may be easier to
adjust PES than to alter, say, the quantity of the input provided. Yet in a dynamic context, relaxing
a constraint may lead to a greater exibility on the part of the producer to respond to external
changes. Both types of intervention have informational requirements in order for adjustments to be
made by policymakers over time. A dynamic extension of our model along with potential empirical
applications is left for future work.
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Ultimately, the fact that relaxing constraints may in some circumstances be preferred by both
parties indicates that it is possible to meet environmental and poverty alleviation goals simultane-
ously. This observation and the general discussion suggest a need for targeting not only with respect
to choice of technology but also with respect to space. While macro-level studies suggest a direct
correlation between poverty and environment (see Sachs et al., 2009), micro-level evidence suggests
that policies such as PES are not necessarily beneting the poor for various reasons including the
presence of market and institutional constraints (see Engel et al., 2008). Conversely, targeting PES
towards the poor may have reduced environmental benets in some schemes, e.g. the SLCP in
China (Uchida et al., 2009). Nevertheless, where constrained producers and environmental assets
coincide, approaches that relax market and institutional constraints could well represent both a
cost-e¤ective and welfare-enhancing alternative to PES.
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9 Tables
Technology E K F Q 
Traditional 1 18.5 0.88 134.5 201.0
Semi-modern (constrained) 7.7 2.4 0.88 134.5 201.0
Semi-modern (unconstrained) 7.7 12.3 1.76 269.0 402.0
Table 1: Characterisation of the technology constraint
10 Figure Titles
Figure 1. Donors preferences over policy intervention and relaxing constraints: variation with
technological parameters and returns to scale (;  and k = + )
Figure 2. Donors preferences over policy intervention: technology ( and ) and the price of
capital (PK).
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Constrained analysis (total, K; and partial, KT ; constraints)
Cost to donor Impact on producer
Policy intervention 1 ha Per hshld dK or dPF dQ d CR dCR DWL
Forest-land payment 1
 
KT

54.3 5.43 5.54 3.4 5.1 NA NA 0.31
Forest-land payment 2
 
K

60.5 6.05 6.17 2.2 5.7 38.7 0 0.35
Capital subsidy (dK) 168.0 16.80 0.71 15. 4 40.0 29.2 26.4 3.21
Unconstrained analysis (following Ferraro and Simpson, 2002)
Policy intervention 1 ha Per hshld dPF or dPK dQ d CR dCR DWL
Forest-land payment (dPF ) 53.9 5.39 2.91 3.5 5.2 NA NA 1.48
Capital subsidy (dPK) 244.1 24.4 1.74 15.3 22.9 NA NA 1.55
Table 2: Price subsidies vs relaxing constraints, constrained vs unconstrained (US$)
Notes
1Building on the static framework of Ferraro and Simpson (2002), Ferraro et al. (2005) develop a dynamic model,
which shows that in contrast to the earlier paper it is possible for both agents to prefer the same policy in a perfect
market setting (in this case PES). In this paper, we retain a static framework but comment on the importance of
dynamics in the nal section.
2The superscript 0 refers to the pre-intervention level of a variable and superscript 1 refers to the post-intervention
level. Similarly, I refers to interventions which relax constraints and D refers to forest-land payments.
3Since the prot maximisation problem is:
max
y
PQy    1C (Q;PK ; PF )
and the rst order condition is:
PQ =
@C
@Pi
4 In 2005, 68.7 percent of Malagasies lived below the poverty line, a gure which rose to 73.5 percent in rural areas
(PNAE 2008).
5A household in the study area cultivates an average of 1.86 hectares (ha) per year, typically rice, maize, cassava
and peanuts.
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6For example, during this time, 288 household questionnaires on local agricultural production were undertaken in
six villages, while another survey comprising a further 70 questionnaires were carried out in regional markets. Further
qualitative interviews were undertaken in four villages to obtain detailed information about beekeeping.
7Bradbear (2009) describes this as one major distinction between the traditional and semi-traditional technologies,
alongside the need for training to use the latter.
8 In e¤ect, by determining EM = 7:7 we have determined that K = KT =7:7 = 2:4: We could have determined the
constraint on the basis of equating prots between traditional and constrained semi-modern production. Not only is
this not what we observe but this makes the constraint even more severe and hence, tips the balance even more in
favour of relaxing constraints.
9Groom and Palmer (2010) show that this condition can be re-written as: PK < 12
 
P 1Iv + P
1D
v

, where P 1Iv and
P 1Dv are the shadow prices of capital after relaxing constraints and paying for forest land, respectively.
10The expression for the shadow price Pv is given by: P 0v = AE

 
KC
 1 PF
AE(KC)
 
 1
; which is used to
evaluate P 1Iv and P
1D
v numerically.
11The proof is available on request. Under the current parameters the expression  < PK=P 0v is: 0:15 < 24=61:4 =
0:39.
12 F:dPF =  0:98   6:17 = 6:05, where 6.17 is the payment per hectare for a single producer.
13For the constrained case, column 3 measures  FdPF for forest-land payments and  PSMK dK for the relaxation
of the capital constraint. For the unconstrained case, column 3 shows  FdPF for forest-land payments, or  KdPSMK
for relaxation of the constraint.
14The initial constraint rent
 
P 0v   PSMK

is US$ 37:7. Under forest-land payments this increases to US$ 38:7 as
the virtual price increases. Otherwise the constraint is relaxed and the constraint rent declines to US$ 29:2.
15The constrained demand for forest is FC =

PF
PQA K

 1
 1
:The virtual price is given by P 0v = PQAE
 K 1  
PF =PQAE
 K
 
 1 .
16Our result concerning returns to scale will hold for homogenous technologies because the value of marginal
productivity is increasing in the degree of homogeneity/returns to scale, k (see Groom and Palmer, 2009).
17The Hukou is a residence permit without which access to public goods in other regions, such as health and
education, is denied. Obtaining the hukou is notoriously di¢ cult and presents an administrative hurdle.
18They may also be ine¤ective if households are self-su¢ cient due to transactions costs (Key et al., 2000) or where
they face a minimum production constraint and lack a fully-functioning output market (Groom et al., 2010).
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Honey Production
Figure 1: Overall Cost E¤ectiveness (Equation 1) and Donors preferences (Equation 2) over price
intervention and relaxing constraints: dependence on technology (,  and returns to scale k =
+ ):
11 Figures
12 Appendix
Direct Payments A second-order approximation for the change in prots when additional forest
is provided via PES. Dropping z for brevity we get:
C
 
PQ; PF + dPF ; PK ; K

t C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K

+ CF dPF +
1
2
CFF (dPF )
2
The total cost of the intervention can be calculated by subtracting from this expression the overall
cost of PES to the donor. This cost is given by the right-hand side of the following expression
F0 +
@F
@PF
dPF

dPF

, where F0 is the initial level of forest cover, and the right-hand side is the
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Figure 2: Overall Cost E¤ectiveness and Donors preferences with Technical Ine¢ ciency ( < 1)
Figure 3: Donors preferences over price intervention and relaxing constraints: dependence on 
and  and and the price of capital (PK).
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deadweight loss:
C
 
PQ; PF + dPF ; PK ; K
 C  PQ; PF ; PK ; K+ F0 + @FC
@PF
dPF

dPF
t CF dPF +
1
2
CFF (dPF )
2 +
  CF   CFFdPF  dPF
t (1  ) CF dPF +

1  1
2

@FC
@PF
(dPF )
2
t
1
2
@FC
@PF
(dPF )
2 +

   1


@FC
@PF
dPF + F0

dPF (11)
The second term arises as a consequence of ine¢ ciency. Note that with perfect technical e¢ ciency
( = 1) this additional term disappears.
Relaxing constraints Following the same procedure yields an expression for the change in prots
following the relaxation of capital constraints:
C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K + d K

t C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K

+ CKd
K +
1
2
CK K (dK)
2
t C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K

+  1
 
P 0v   PK

dK +
1
2
CK K (dK)
2
The resource cost of the policy, PKdK; has already been subtracted, so the net deadweight losses
are:19
C
 
PQ; PF ; PK ; K + dK
 C  PQ; PF ; PK ; K
t
1
2
@Pv
@ K
(dK)2 +  1
 
P 0v   PK

dK (12)
where P 0v is the initial virtual price of capital at K = K. Clearly the quota rent is now inated by
technical ine¢ ciency when  < 1:
Cost e¤ectiveness Taking (12) from (11) yields an expression for the incremental cost of relaxing
constraints relative to PES:
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If this is positive then forest-land payments are preferred by the donor. Once again, the intro-
duction of technical ine¢ ciency leads to an indeterminate result on cost-e¤ectiveness. The technical
ine¢ ciency parameter both inates the virtual price, in favour of relaxing constraints, and intro-
duces an additional prot term which favours PES. The essence of the Groom and Palmer (2010)
result remains though.
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